We develop efficient algorithms to construct utility maximizing mechanisms in the presence of risk averse players (buyers and sellers) in Bayesian single parameter and multi-parameter settings. We model risk aversion by a concave utility function, and players play strategically to maximize their expected utility. Bayesian mechanism design has usually focused on maximizing expected revenue in a risk neutral environment, i.e. where all the buyers and the seller have linear utility, and no succinct characterization of expected utility maximizing mechanisms is known even for single-parameter multi-unit auctions.
Introduction
Bayesian mechanism design has usually focused on maximizing expected revenue in a risk neutral environment, i.e. where all the buyers and the seller have linear utility, and choose their strategy with the aim of maximizing their expected payoff. However, since the payoff is a random outcome that depends on other players' valuations and strategies, there is risk associated with it. A standard model [4, 13] that captures risk aversion assumes that a player has a non-decreasing concave utility function U : (−∞, ∞) → (−∞, ∞), so that when the payoff obtained is R, the player's utility is U(R). The player may choose to express various levels of risk aversion by specifying a suitable concave function as his utility, and then his aim becomes to maximize his expected utility. While mechanism design in a risk neutral (linear utility) environment is well understood for multi-unit auctions, many properties tend to break down in the presence of risk aversion (concave utility). In this paper, we develop efficient algorithms to compute mechanisms in the presence of risk averse players. We mainly focus on the prominent single parameter setting of multi-unit auctions.
Risk neutral Seller, Risk Averse Buyers:
Let us first analyze the effect of risk aversion among buyers when the seller is risk neutral, i.e. he wants to maximize his expected revenue. This has been the predominant model for studying risk aversion in mechanism design. Myerson's characterization [12] of the optimal auction design does not apply when buyers are risk averse. In particular, revenue equivalence [12] does not hold, and an optimal dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism may generate less expected revenue than an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism. This is because when buyers are risk averse, the seller can extract greater expected revenue by offering a deterministic payment scheme to the buyers and charging extra for this insurance. As a specific example, consider buyers with constant absolute risk aversion, i.e. exponentially diminishing marginal utility. For any DSIC mechanism (such as Myerson's), one can construct a corresponding BIC mechanism with the same allocation curves: if a buyer i reports valuation v, charge a deterministic payment α(i, v) (perhaps zero) if the buyer does not get the item, and β(i, v) if he gets the item. For the latter mechanism to be truthful, it must satisfy utility equivalence [10, 11, 8] : the net expected utility of the buyer in the latter mechanism must match the former when his value is v, for each v. However, if his expected payment in the latter mechanism remains equal to the former, then his net expected utility will go up, because concave utility makes the deterministic payment more preferable. Thus the expected payment must be higher in the latter mechanism, implying greater revenue. Note that the direct revelation principle still holds, so there is a BIC mechanism that generates as much expected revenue as any Bayes-Nash equilibrium a .
Maskin and Riley [9] characterized optimal BIC mechanism in this setting for selling a single item when buyers' value distributions are IID. It is assumed that the buyers' utility functions are known to the mechanism designer (the seller), since truthfulness itself depends on these functions. Another well-known result states that under some natural assumptions on the buyers' utility functions, firstprice auction with reserve (specifically, Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this auction) generates greater revenue than second-price auction with the same reserve [10, 9, 11] . These results show that the presence of risk averse buyers should have substantial effect on optimal mechanism design.
Our results for a k-unit auction are summarized in Table 1 . We first design a poly-time algorithm to compute a BIC mechanism for a risk neutral seller when buyers are risk averse with publicly known utility functions. This result extends the work of Maskin and Riley [9] , in a computational sense, to the general setting of multi-unit auctions with non-identical distributions. Our algorithm is a Any equilibrium of the mechanism where buyers play strategically to maximize their utility. ) for large k. d Improves to (1−1/e)γ(k)−ǫ for IID buyers (Theorem 3). Further, the factor improves to (1−1/e−ǫ) if k ≥ 1/ǫ 3 . Here, comparison is made only against optimal BIC satisfying: (i) ex-post IR, and (ii) no positive transfers. a linear program developed using a general form of Border's inequality. Further, we design a a polytime computable randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism which is a γ(k)-approximation to the utility optimal BIC mechanism. Here, γ(k) = (1 − ) for large k. A mechanism is said to be truthful in expectation (TIE) if truth-telling maximizes each buyer's expected utility, regardless of other buyers' bids (expected utility is measured only over the random bits used by the mechanism). This is a stronger truthfulness requirement than BIC, but weaker than DSIC b , and does not rely on all buyers sharing the same belief about each other. TIE mechanisms can still generate greater expected revenue than DSIC mechanisms. In effect, this result bounds the gap between TIE mechanisms and BIC mechanisms.
Risk Averse Seller, Risk Averse Buyers: Next, we consider the scenario where the seller as well as the buyers are risk averse. Risk aversion from a seller's perspective has received relatively less attention, and no work has considered both sides to be risk averse. Eso and Futo [7] designed an optimal BIC mechanism for a risk averse seller when buyers are risk neutral. In this setting, the seller can transfer the entire risk to risk neutral buyers, and obtain the expected revenue of Myerson's mechanism in every realization. A DSIC mechanism cannot do such a risk transfer, and as such, the gap between optimal BIC and optimal DSIC is unbounded, as illustrated below. Example. Consider an instance with two buyers and two items. Each buyer has valuation 1 for the item w.p. ǫ and 0 otherwise. The seller's utility function U is as follows: U(t) = min{t, ǫ}. The utility optimal DSIC mechanism sets a price of 1 to each buyer, and gets utility ǫ with probability 2ǫ(1 − ǫ) ≤ 2ǫ, otherwise its utility is 0. So the expected utility of an optimal DSIC mechanism is at most 2ǫ 2 . If the first buyer is risk neutral, then we can design a BIC mechanism as follows: charge the first buyer ǫ in every realization (even when his value is zero), and set a price of 1 to the second buyer. If the second buyer pays up 1 (which happens w.p. ǫ), then pay 1 dollar to the first buyer. The first buyer never gets the item, and the mechanism is incentive compatible for the first b In this paper, we require that in a DSIC mechanism, truth-telling must maximize buyers' utility regardless of the mechanism's random bits. This distinction between DSIC and TIE will play a crucial role below.
buyer. The seller gets a revenue of ǫ in every realization, so his expected utility is ǫ. Therefore the gap is unbounded as ǫ → 0. However, the extent to which the seller can transfer its risk to the buyers depends upon buyers' utility functions. So the result of [7] does not hold when buyers are risk averse. We design TIE mechanisms that are constant approximation to a utility-optimal BIC mechanism for a risk averse seller. We restrict our comparison only to BIC mechanisms that do not allow positive transfers (i.e. there is no payment from the seller to any buyer in any realization), and are ex post individually rational. Our approximation factor is (1 − 1/e) 2 γ(k) ((1 − 1/e)γ(k) for IID buyers), and approaches (1 − 1/e) (using a slightly different algorithm) as k becomes large. This implies a constant upper bound on the gap between TIE mechanisms and BIC mechanisms without positive transfer.
DSIC mechanisms for Risk Averse Sellers: So far, we have designed BIC or TIE mechanisms assuming that the players' utility functions are known to the designer. Though this has been a standard assumption through most of the literature on risk aversion, it is usually the seller who designs the mechanism, and it is not practical to assume that the seller knows all the buyers' utility functions. Unfortunately, it is impossible in general to even check if a mechanism is BIC or even TIE (or identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a given mechanism) without knowing the buyers' utility functions. In contrast, DSIC mechanisms are independent of buyers' utility functions as long as buyers' utility functions are non-decreasing. So we do not need to know the buyers' utility functions to compute a utility-optimal DSIC mechanism for the seller.
Clearly, for a risk-neutral seller, Myerson's mechanism remains an optimal DSIC mechanism even when buyers are risk averse. However, that is not true for a risk averse seller. Further, a virtual value maximization approach does not apply when the seller has at least two units of inventory c . This is because the contributions of different buyers cannot be counted separately when the seller has non-linear utility. We design a poly-time computable (1 − 1/e − ǫ)-approximate DSIC mechanism. Our mechanism is a sequential posted-pricing mechanism (SPM), that decides a price for each buyer, and then makes take-it-or-leave it offers to the buyers in decreasing order of prices, till inventory runs out. Posted pricing mechanisms have been studied extensively for maximizing expected revenue (eg. [6, 5, 16] ).
Sundarajan and Yan [14] designed DSIC mechanisms for multi-unit auctions for a risk-averse seller when buyers' valuation functions are regular. They focused only on mechanisms that do not depend even on the seller's own utility function. While this may be an attractive property, the optimal mechanism is no longer well-defined in this case (even neglecting computational limitations), and it forces the approximation guarantees to be weaker -1/8-approximation for regular distributions (1/2 when there is unlimited supply of items), and there is a lower bound instance implying unbounded gap for general distributions. Non-regular distributions are not uncommonany distribution with more than one mode is non-regular. Risk aversion is particularly important in the presence of such high variance distributions, and it is a reasonable approach for a seller to decide upon his own utility function and then use our algorithm to design a mechanism.
As a final note, we are able to extend our techniques to give a constant approximation to an optimal deterministic DSIC mechanism in a multi-parameter setting, namely, when there are multiple distinct items and unit-demand buyers (see Appendix E).
c If there is only one item to sale, then at most one buyer pays in any realization, and the seller's utility can be maximized by scaling the bid values using the utility function.
Overview of Techniques
We first design a DSIC mechanism for a risk averse seller, which turns out to be a relatively simpler problem than competing against optimal BIC mechanism. We establish our main probabilistic tools in the process, which later get used for our BIC results. For DSIC mechanisms, we first argue that a (1 − 1 e )-approximate (randomized) SPM can be obtained by using the same price distribution as that offered to each buyer in the optimal mechanism, except that the prices are now set independently (see Lemma 3.3) . The argument uses the correlation gap bound of Agrawal et. al. [1] for submodular objectives. However, this is only an existential result, since getting the SPM requires oracle access to a utility-optimal DSIC mechanism.
Our main technical contribution is to show that it suffices (with same loss factor of (1 − 1/e)) to match the optimal mechanism only in the sum of sale probabilities over all buyers, and not the sale probability for each buyer, at every price. That is, any two mechanisms that match in this coarse footprint will have approximately equal expected utility. This property follows from a generalization of the correlation gap bound in [1] , which not only introduces independence but also redistributes probability mass across variables (see Lemma 3.7). The redistribution is achieved by splitting and merging random variables to transform one given mechanism to another that matches the coarse footprint. Using a sophisticated classification of prices, we show that it suffices to match an even coarser footprint containing only constant number of parameters, which define a configuration. The algorithm finds a feasible solution for each configuration using a covering LP. Then, it simulates these SPMs, one for each feasible configuration, to choose one with the highest expected utility.
To design a BIC mechanism when the seller as well as the buyers are risk averse, the techniques developed for DSIC mechanisms can be used to establish that if allocation and payment functions of the optimal mechanism across buyers are made independent, and inventory constraints removed, the utility will be at least (1 − 1/e)OPT BIC . However, to convert such a soft mechanism into a mechanism that strictly satisfies the inventory constraint is not easy: if we restrict the allocation to buyers with top k payments in a realization of a soft mechanism, a function which is submodular, the resulting mechanism is no longer BIC. Further, distributions on the revenue from any two allocations in the mechanism are incomparable, so restricting to first k allocations in a realization of a soft mechanism can be arbitrarily bad. To overcome this problem, we develop a mechanism with L → ∞ rounds, such that in each round, each buyer is ignored with a high probability of (1 − 1/L). We show that the revenue from each allocation in this mechanism has identical distribution, and the loss in the expected utility caused by imposing the hard inventory constraint is bounded.
Organization: Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some background material. In Sections 3 and 4, we present our DSIC and BIC mechanisms for risk averse seller, respectively. Our BIC mechanisms for the risk neutral seller and risk averse buyers appear in Appendix D, and our result for multi-parameter unit-demand setting appears in Appendix E.
Preliminaries
Single Parameter Multi-Unit Auctions: The seller provides a single type of item (or service), of which he has k identical copies. There are n buyers {1, 2, . . . n}, who have some private value for that service. Let buyer i have a valuation of v i for the item (and he can consume only one unit), which is drawn, independent of other buyers' valuations, from a known distribution with cdf
Revenue, Utility and Optimality: The revenue Rev(M, v) of a mechanism M, when the realized valuation vector is v, is the sum of payments from each buyers. The expected revenue of a mechanism Rev(M) is E v [Rev(M, v)]. In this work, we assume that the seller has a monotonically increasing concave utility function U, which also satisfies U(0) = 0. The utility of the mechanism is U(Rev(M, v)), and the expected utility of the mechanism is U(M) = E v [U(Rev(M, v))]. Let OPT DSIC and OPT BIC denote the expected utility of a utility-optimal DSIC and BIC mechanisms respectively. A mechanism is said to be an α-approximation to optimal DSIC (or BIC) mechanism if U(M) ≥ αOPT DSIC (or U(M) ≥ αOPT BIC ).
DSIC Mechanisms: It is well-known (eg. [12] ) that a DSIC mechanism sets a (possibly randomized) price for buyer i based on v −i but independent of v i , and buyer i gets an item if and only if his valuation exceeds this price. Given this characterization, it is easy to see that as long as a buyer has a non-decreasing utility function, he will report truthfully in a DSIC mechanism, for any realization of valuation vector and random bits of the mechanism. Note that random bits do not help a DSIC mechanism obtain greater utility, since the definition of DSIC implies that truthfulness must hold even if the random bits were revealed prior to submitting bids. So there is a utility-optimal DSIC mechanism which is deterministic.
Buyer's Risk Aversion and BIC Mechanisms: Each buyer i is associated with a publicly known monotone concave utility function U i (defined on the value of item received minus payment) with U i (0) = 0. A BIC mechanism is associated with two functions h(·, ·, ·) and g(·, ·, ·): h(i, j, v) is the probability that for valuation v, buyer i is allocated an item for a payment of p j , and g(i, j, v) is the probability that he pays p j and is not allocated an item for valuation v. We refer to these two functions as the payment functions of the mechanism. We note that the allocation and payment of a buyer is possibly correlated with other buyers' payments, allocations as well as their valuations. Thus, a mechanism is BIC if and only if for each i, v, v ′ , we have
We note, given any buyer i, we allow his payment to be randomized rather than a fixed value as a function of buyer i's valuation and whether he gets an item. This strictly gives more power to a risk averse seller maximizing his expected utility. This is in contrast to the setting considered by Maskin and Riley [9] , where it suffices to assume that buyer i's payment for valuation v is a fixed value as a function of v and whether he gets the item.
We define a soft randomized sequential mechanism as a mechanism without inventory limit that arranges buyers in an arbitrary order, asks each buyer for his valuation one-by-one. If the buyer i's reported valuation is v, the mechanism allocates an item to him independently w.p. j h(i, j, v). If he is allocated an item, then the seller charges him p j w.p.
. When he is not allocated an item, he pays p j w.p.
. Randomized sequential mechanisms are same as soft randomized sequential mechanisms with an exception that they stop after running out of inventory. We note that if a soft randomized sequential mechanism is BIC, then the corresponding randomized sequential mechanism is also BIC.
Stochastic Dominance: Given two non-negative distributions D 1 and D 2 , we say
We note an important property of concave functions in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 Given any non-decreasing concave function U, and three independent non-negative
Risk Averse Seller: DSIC Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
In this section, we construct DSIC mechanisms for a risk averse seller. The following theorem summarizes our result.
Theorem 1 For multi-unit auctions, there is a poly-time computable deterministic SPM with expected utility at least (1 − 1 e − ǫ)OPT, for any ǫ > 0, where OPT is the expected utility of an optimal DSIC mechanism.
We first prove the existence of an SPM that achieves a (1 − 1/e)-approximation to the optimal expected utility (Section 3.1), however this result is not constructible and does not lead to an efficient implementation. We then identify a set of sufficient properties of (1 − 1/e − ǫ)-approximate mechanisms that enables us to construct a poly-time algorithm (Section 3.2).
Existence of a (1 − 1/e)-approximate SPM
Given a set S = {x 1 , x 2 . . . x n } of non-negative real number, let max i {x 1 , x 2 . . . x n } denote the i th largest value in the set, and let it be zero if i > n. Let U k : R n → R be the function defined as
. . x n }), i.e. utility of the sum of the k largest arguments. Let U(S) denote U ∞ (S) = U |S| (S), the utility of the sum of all variables. We note an important property of U k in the following lemma; its proof is deferred to the appendix. Lemma 3.1 For any concave utility function U, and any k and n, the function U k : R n → R is a symmetric, monotone and submodular.
We shall use the following correlation gap bound established by Agrawal et. al. [1] for monotone submodular functions.
Lemma 3.2 [1]
Given n non-negative random variables X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n with distributions D 1 , D 2 , ..., D n , let D be an arbitrary joint distribution over these n random variables such that the marginal distribution for each X i remains unchanged. Let D ind be the joint distribution where each X i is sampled from D i independent of X −i . Then for any monotone submodular function f over X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n , we have
Let M OPT be a utility optimal DSIC mechanism for a k-unit auction. It follows that in M OPT , every buyer i is offered a (random) price P i as a function of other buyers' bids; he receives an item and pays the offered price if and only if his value exceeds the price. The following lemma uses the correlation gap to establish the existence of an SPM which is a (1 − 1/e)-approximation to M OPT . Lemma 3.3 Suppose that M OPT offers a (random) price P i to each buyer i (the prices P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, may be correlated). Let M ′ be a randomized SPM that selects an independent random price P ′ i for each buyer, such that P ′ i and P i have the same marginal distribution, and offers items to buyers in decreasing order of prices, until the items run out. Then
Proof: Let R i be the payment obtained in M OPT from buyer i. Note that P i and R i are correlated random variables that depend on the realization of the valuations, and R i = P i if v i > P i , else R i = 0. As at most k buyers can make a positive payment in any realization of M OPT , we have
Since the SPM M ′ orders buyers in decreasing order of offer prices, so it collects the k largest acceptable prices as payment. We have
Note that R i and R ′ i have the same distribution for each i, except that R 1 , R 2 . . . R n are correlated variables, while R ′ 1 , R ′ 2 . . . R ′ n are mutually independent. Using the submodularity of U k (Lemma 3.1) and the correlation gap (Lemma 3.2), we get
This completes the proof. Correlation gap was used by Yan [16] to show the same approximation ratio for an SPM to expected revenue maximization. However, for revenue maximization, it suffices for the SPM to match a revenue-optimal mechanism only in the probability of sale to each buyer, which solely determines the buyer's contribution to expected revenue. In contrast, for the utility maximization result of Lemma 3.3, the SPM should match a utility-optimal mechanism in the entire distribution of prices to each buyer. Also, the SPM for revenue maximization is poly-time computable, since a revenue-optimal mechanism is known (Myerson's mechanism). To the best of our knowledge, the SPM designed in Lemma 3.3 is not poly-time computable: constructing it would need an oracle access to a utility-optimal mechanism. Further, as we have to match M OPT for each buyer-price pair, guessing the entire price distribution would require time exponential in the number of buyers.
Algorithm to compute a (1 − 1/e − ǫ)-approximate SPM
We now present a polynomial time algorithm to compute an SPM whose approximation guarantee essentially matches the existential result above. To simplify the exposition of our algorithm, we assume that prices offered by any truthful mechanism belong to some known set P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} whose size is polynomial in n. Let π ij be the probability that buyer i is offered price p j in M OPT . We divide the prices in P into 3 classes, small, large and huge. Fix some 1 > ǫ > 0. Let P hg be the set of huge prices defined as p j ≥ U −1 (OPT/ǫ). The distinction between small and large prices depend more intricately on the optimal mechanism. Let p * be the largest price such that
e. the threshold where the total sale probability of all large prices add up to at least 1/ǫ 4 . If such a threshold does not exist, then let p * = 0 (note that p * must be zero if k < 1/ǫ 4 ). Let P sm be all prices less than p * , so that
In the following lemma, we present a key set of sufficient conditions for a (1−1/e−ǫ)-approximate mechanism which forms the basis of our algorithm; we defer its proof to later in the section.
Lemma 3.4 states that instead of matching M OPT in the probability mass of each <buyer, largeprice> pair, it suffices to match the total probability mass at each large price, summed over all buyers. Thus the probability mass can be redistributed across buyers without much loss in utility.
Further, Lemma 3.4 effectively states that the contribution of the small prices and the large prices can be linearized. Intuitively, if the small prices make a significant contribution to utility, then the mechanism must be collecting many small prices, so the total revenue from small prices exhibits a concentration around its expectation. Moreover, whenever a huge price is obtained in a realization, we can neglect the contribution from all other buyers in that realization, without losing much of the expected utility. So the contribution of huge prices can be measured separately. This separation of huge and small prices from large prices enables us to keep the number of distinct large prices to at most a constant.
Algorithm:
We give an outline of the algorithm; the details are provided in the appendix. From Lemma 3.4, it suffices to match M OPT in (a) the expected revenue from the small prices (R), (b) the expected contribution to utility from the huge prices H, and (c) the total sale probability at each large price (q j ). The values of these parameters define a configuration, and we guess the value of each parameter with appropriate discretization. The number of distinct configurations is bounded by 2 poly(1/ǫ) . For each configuration, we check if there exists an SPM satisfying the configuration, using the covering linear program (LP) below. In the LP, the variable x ij denotes the probability that buyer i is offered price p j .
Any feasible solution to this linear program gives a distribution of prices for each buyer, which gives us an SPM that satisfies the guessed configuration. We iterate through all the configurations, and pick the best among these SPMs. A deterministic SPM with desired utility guarantees can be easily identified by sampling from this randomized SPM.
Proof of Lemma 3.4
We begin by introducing two operations on random variables, split and merge. Using these two operations, we prove two key properties of random variables in Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8; Lemma 3.4 would follow as a corollary of these two lemmas.
Split and Merge Operations: We now define two operations, merge and split, on non-negative random variables. In the merge operation, given a set S of independent non-negative random variables, let X i , X j be any two variables in S such that Pr [
and Y is independent of other variables in S\{X i , X j }.
The split operation breaks a random variable into a set of independent variables. Formally, given a set S of non-negative (possibly correlated) random variables, first the variables in S are made mutually independent, and then each variable X i ∈ S is split into an arbitrary pre-specified set of independent random variables {X i1 , X i2 , ..., X it } such that for each
and the sets of variables created are also made mutually independent. Intuitively, the merge operation introduces negative correlation. Analogously, the split operation introduces independence. In Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, we establish useful properties of merge and the split operations for a concave non-decreasing function; their proofs are deferred to the appendix. Lemma 3.5 Let S be a set of independent non-negative random variables, Let X 1 , X 2 ∈ S, and let Y be the variable formed by merging X 1 and
Lemma 3.6 Consider a sequence of split operations on a set S of arbitrarily correlated non-negative random variables and let S ′ be the set of independent random variables at the end of the split
Using these two operations, we establish an important property in the following lemma, that not only introduces independence across correlated random variables, but also allows to redistribute the probability mass across variables. Lemma 3.7 Given an arbitrarily correlated set S = {X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n }of non-negative random variables, consider any set
Proof: We perform the split operation on S to create a set Y = {Y ijl } of variables as follows: for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
and 0 otherwise. Using Lemma 3.6, we get that 
The following lemma effectively states that, given a set of independent random variables, the contribution to the utility of huge values can be separated, and for small values, the variables can be replaced by their expectations; we defer its proof to the appendix. Lemma 3.8 Given any ǫ > 0 and a set of independent non-negative random variables S = {X 1 , X 2 , X 3 . . .} such that X i takes value p i w.p. π i and 0 otherwise, where
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 3.4. The revenue from a buyer in a mechanism can be represented by a random variable, possibly correlated with other buyers' random variables. Let M ′ be a mechanism that matches M OPT on the total sale probability for each price, and its sale probability for each <buyer, large-price> pair is same as M. Using Lemma 3.7, we get U(M ′ ) ≥ (1 − 1/e)U(M OPT ). As M and M ′ have (approximately) identical revenues from small prices and utilities from huge prices, we can invoke Lemma 3.8 to establish that U(M) ≥ (1 − ǫ)U(M ′ ). This completes the proof.
Risk Averse Seller and Risk Averse Buyers: BIC Mechanisms
We design mechanisms when buyers as well as the seller are risk averse, and the seller's objective is to maximize his expected utility. We make two assumptions: (a) for any i, t < 0, U i (0) = 0 and U i (t) = −∞; this implies that the mechanism is ex post individually rational, and the payment from a buyer is 0 whenever he does not get the item, (b) we further restrict to the set of mechanisms in which payments are always non-negative, i.e. there is no positive transfer from the seller to a buyer. Consider any mechanism M that satisfies these assumptions, let g(·, ·, ·) and h(·,
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 2. Let M OPT be a utility optimal BIC mechanism with these two restrictions, and h OPT (·, ·, ·) be its payment function.
Overall Idea: Consider any soft randomized sequential mechanism M ′ that processes buyers independently (according to its payment function h ′ (·, ·, ·)), and matches M OPT for (a) the total probability of each large payment summed over all buyers, (b) the total revenue from small payments and (c) the utility from huge payments. Using techniques developed for DSIC mechanisms, we get U(M ′ ) ≥ (1 − 1/e)OPT. However, converting such soft mechanism into a mechanism that strictly satisfies the inventory constraint while maintaining truthfulness is not easy. In the case of DSIC mechanisms, the buyers were arranged in a decreasing order of prices, noting that top-k is a submodular function. Here, if we allocate items to buyers with top-k payments in a realization of M ′ , then the mechanism is no longer truthful. Further, as first-k is not a sub-modular function, the desired approximation guarantee cannot be proven if we process buyers according to a fixed order. We get around this problem by constructing a mechanism with L → ∞ rounds, where in every round, each buyer is processed independently w.p. 1/L. The revenue from each allocation in this mechanism has an identical distribution. This helps to limit the loss caused by imposing strict inventory constraints. We now describe our mechanism in detail.
The Mechanism: Our mechanism M rounds consists of L → ∞ rounds and h rounds (·, ·, ·) is the payment function associated with it. In each round, buyers arrive according to a predefined order. When buyer i arrives, subject to availability of items, he is independently processed with probability 1 L as follows: if his reported valuation is v, then he is given an item w.p. j h rounds (i, j, v), and whenever he is given an item, he makes a payment of p j w.p.
l h rounds (i,l,v) . Once processed, buyer i is not considered for any future rounds. Further, the payment function h rounds (·, ·, ·) satisfies following properties:
We draw a parallel between the properties of h rounds (·, ·, ·) with the algorithm developed in the case of DSIC mechanisms: the first three properties are equivalent to designing a mechanism that matches M OPT in the total probability for each large payment, the expected revenue from small payments and the expected utility from huge payments. The fourth constraint establishes the truthfulness of M rounds , and the last constraint ensures its feasibility in expectation. We further note that M rounds is truthful-in-expectation: conditioned on processing buyer i in some round, the payment function ensures truthfulness in terms of his expected utility.
The following lemma bounds the utility of M rounds , we defer its proof to later in the section.
Algorithm: To construct an algorithm, we guess the total probability for each large payment (q j ), the utility from huge payments (H) and the revenue from the small payments (R). The feasibility of a configuration can be checked using a covering LP; the details of the LP are given in the appendix. There are 2 poly(1/ǫ) configurations, and we select a feasible configuration with maximum expected utility. Further, the number of rounds can be limited to O(n 2 ) with a small loss in the approximation factor. To establish our result, it remains to prove Lemma 4.1.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let I copies be an instance of the problem where each buyer is split into L independent copies, the copies of buyer i are i1, i2, ..., iL, and the valuation for each copy is drawn independently from F i . Consider a mechanism M soft on I copies with L iterations. The lth copy of every buyer is considered in the lth iteration; when buyer il arrives, M soft discards him w.p.
(1 − 1/L), otherwise it processes him according to h rounds (i, ·, ·). In the following lemma, we lower bound the utility of M soft ; its proof follows from Lemma 3.7 and Lemma 3.8.
To simplify notation, in the rest of the proof, we refer to the payment function of M soft by h(·, ·, ·).
Observe that mechanisms M rounds and M soft are equivalent with two exceptions: (a) hard inventory constraint of M rounds , and (b) M soft can process more than one copy of a buyer in a realization. We first address the issue of the inventory constraint. Using the correlation gap, we get that the expected number of allocations in M soft after first k allocations is at most k exp /e. This alone is not sufficient to prove the lemma as U is not linear. We note a crucial property of M soft in Lemma 4.3, it establishes that the revenue from any allocation in M soft has an identical distribution. Let D i be the distribution on the revenue from first i allocations in M soft .
Lemma 4.3 As L → ∞, we have Pr
Proof: Let Y l be a random variable indicating the revenue made in round l. Clearly Y l and Y l ′ have the same distribution for any l, l ′ ≤ L. Furthermore, as L → ∞, conditioned on one allocation in an iteration, the probability of an additional allocation in the same iteration is (almost) 0. Thus
. Conditioned on ith allocation happening in round l, the probability that ith allocation has revenue p j , is exactly Pr [Y l = p j |Y l = 0]. This proves the lemma.
Consider a new mechanism M hard on I copies that is identical to M soft with an exception that it stops after k allocations. We now bound its utility.
Lemma 4.4 As
Proof: As payments are non-negative, using Lemma 4.3, we get D i D j for each i and j < i. The contribution to the utility from the ith allocation in M sof t is
Let Z i denote the above quantity. Using stochastic dominance of D i over D j for every j < i and Lemma 4.3, we get that Z i ≤ Z j for any j < i.
As the allocations in M soft are independent, and the expected number of allocations in M soft after first k allocations can be bounded by k exp (1 − γ(k) ). Let r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n be the probabilities of 1st, 2nd, ..., nth allocation in M soft . We have r i ≥ r >i , thus we get
This proves the lemma.
To bound the utility of M rounds , we need to address one more issue: M hard can process more than one copy of a buyer. Let D i1 be the distribution on the revenue from all copies of first i buyers in M soft . Let D i2 be the distribution on the revenue from first i buyers in M rounds . As payments are non-negative, we have D i1 D i2 . Furthermore, for any fixed i, for each l, the distribution on the revenue from the lth allocation among buyer i's copies is same. The expected number of copies of buyer i processed in M soft is 1. Using correlation gap, the expected number of rounds in which buyer i is processed in M hard after first processing is 1/e. Using stochastic dominance of D i1 over D i2 , the expected loss in the utility can be bounded by a factor 1/e. This completes the proof. Now we give an improved result when k ≥ 1/ǫ 3 . In a soft randomized sequential mechanism with payment function same as M rounds , if we discard each buyer independently w.p. ǫ, then w.p. at least (1 − ǫ), we do not run out of items. The (1 − 1/e − O(ǫ))-approximation follows by the following property of concave functions.
Lemma 4.5 Let X be a random variable that takes value between 0 and R for some R > 0. Then,
(U(R) − U(0)) for any non-decreasing concave function U.
A Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. It is obvious that U k is monotone and symmetric. Let x = (x 1 , x 2 . . . x n ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 . . . y n ), and let max{x, y} = (z 1 , z 2 . . . z n ) and min{x, y}
To show submodularity we need to show that for any x, y
Or equivalently, that for any x ≥ y (i.e. x i ≥ y i ∀i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and t ≥ x i ≥ y i , if x ∧ i t = x 1 . . . x i−1 , t, x i+1 . . . and y ∧ i t = y 1 . . . y i−1 , t, y i+1 . . ., then
We shall prove the latter statement. Let I k (x) = k j=1 max j (x). It is easy to see that
The statement now follows from noting that
Proof of Lemma 3.5. The lemma follows from the fact that U k is submodular -in fact, it applies to any submodular function. Let {p 1 , p 2 , ..., p ℓ } be the set of different non-zero values realized by either X 1 or X 2 with non-zero probability. Let π i , π ′ i be the probabilities that X 1 and X 2 realize to p i , respectively. Fix a realization of random variables in S\{X 1 , X 2 }, and let this realization be denoted byẑ; in this case, we shall express
The last inequality follows from the definition of submodularity. Since the above inequality holds for anyẑ, the lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. This lemma holds for any monotone submodular function, including U k . If a variable X i ∈ S is split into {X i1 , X i2 , ..., X it }, then the realization of X i can be simulated by 1≤j≤t X ij with appropriate correlation among them. Thus with appropriate correlation among the variables in S ′ , we can ensure that
. When variables in S ′ are made independent, its expected utility is at least (1 − 1 e )E [U k (S)], by the correlation gap bound in Lemma 3.2, since U k is monotone and submodular.
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Our proof has 3 steps. Our first step is to separate the contribution of S hg from the rest.
Proof: It is easy to upper bound the expected utility:
For the lower bound, note that
Further, the probability that some particular X i ∈ S hg is non-zero, while all other variables in S hg are zero, is at least π i (1 − ǫ). So we have
Without loss of generality, we may assume that 1/ǫ is an integer. Our second step establishes that for k > 1/ǫ 4 , one may simply assume that k = ∞.
Proof: The first inequality trivially follows from the definition of
Since k > 1/ǫ 4 and X i ∈S ′ π i ≤ k, so the probability of the event that the number of non-zero variables in a realization exceeds k(1 + ǫ), is at most ǫ. This follows directly from Chebyshev's inequality. Conditioned on this event, the expected contribution to U(S ′ ) from variables that are positive but does not contribute to U k(1+ǫ) (S ′ ), is at most E [U(S ′ )]. This is because the realizations of these excess positive variables is independent of the said event. So the difference between E [U(S ′ )] and E U k(1+ǫ) (S ′ ) is at most ǫE [U(S ′ )], hence the second inequality.
Our third claim, combined with the first claim, completes the proof of Lemma 3.8.
Proof: Also, if k ≤ 1/ǫ 4 , then S sm = ∅ by definition, so the claim is trivially true; so we assume that k > 1/ǫ 4 . Then, by our second claim above, E [U k (S ′ )] is approximated within a factor of (1 + 2ǫ) by E [U(S ′ )]. So it suffices to show that E [U(S ′ )] is approximated within a factor of (1±O(ǫ)) by E U E [S sm ] + X i ∈S lg X i . Again, the upper bound is easy to obtain:
For the lower bound, let us first consider the case that
Now let us assume that E [S sm ] < p * /ǫ 3 . In this case, we show below that
Note that with probability at least (1−ǫ), the number of non-zero variables in S lg is at least (1−ǫ)/ǫ 4 (by Chebyshev's inequality on the indicator variables of X i ), which implies that
Both the first and second inequalities follow from concavity of U, while the last inequality holds
A.1 Detailed Algorithm for the DSIC Mechanism
From Lemma 3.4, it suffices to guess (a) the threshold p * separating large and small prices, (b) the total probability of sale q k for each large price p k , (c) the expected revenue from small prices R, and (d) the expected contribution to utility, say h, from huge prices. The large prices (and hence the threshold p * as well) can be discretized so that they come only from the set U −1 (ǫ 5 tOPT) for any integer 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 ǫ 6 . This is because the loss in utility due to discretization, in every realization, is at most ǫ 5 OPT per sale at a large price. This is immediate if the large price sale is the first sale to occur in the realization, and concavity implies that the loss can only be smaller if some revenue has already been collected in the realization. So the total loss in expected utility due to this discretization is at most ǫ 5 OPT times the expected number of large prices sales. Since there are O( 1 ǫ 4 ) large price sales in expectation, the loss is O(ǫOPT). Similarly, h and U(R) can be guessed up to a multiple of ǫOPT. We shall guess the total sale probability for each large price to the nearest multiple of ǫ 8 . The total error over all price buckets is less than ǫ 2 and so the loss in the utility due to rounding of the probability masses is bounded by ǫOPT. All these guesses define a configuration. The number of configurations is bounded by 2 poly(1/ǫ) . For each configuration we check if there exists an SPM satisfying the configuration, using the covering linear program (LP) below. In this, the variable x ij denotes the probability that buyer i is offered price p j .
Any feasible solution to this linear program gives a distribution of prices for each buyer, which gives us an SPM that satisfies the guessed configuration. For the configuration that matches M OPT , any feasible solution of the program gives an SPM that is a (1 − 1/e − ǫ)-approximation. So our algorithm is to iterate through all the configurations, generate at most one randomized SPM for each configuration, and then simulate them to find out, with high confidence, the best among these SPMs.
B BIC Mechanisms for a Risk Averse Seller and Risk Averse IID Buyers
In this section, we consider the problem of designing a BIC mechanism for a risk averse seller when buyers are risk averse, each buyer's valuation is drawn IID from a known distribution F and their utility functions U are identical. The following theorem summarizes our result in this setting.
Theorem 3 There exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute a truthful-in-expectation mechanism with expected utility (1 − ǫ) 1 − 1 e γ(k)OPT, where OPT is the expected utility of the optimal BIC mechanism.
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 3. We call a mechanism to be symmetric if, for all i = i ′ , j, v, we have h(i, j, v) = h(i ′ , j, v). We first establish an important property of symmetric mechanisms in the following lemma.
Lemma B.1 There exists a utility optimal BIC mechanism that is symmetric for all buyers.
Proof: If the optimal BIC mechanism M OPT is not symmetric, then consider a new mechanism M ′ that for every set of reported bids, renames buyers randomly, and runs M OPT on the these bids. Clearly U(M OPT ) = U(M ′ ). To prove the lemma, it suffices to establish that M ′ is a BIC mechanism. Fix any buyer i, his utility in M ′ for reporting his true valuation v is
and his utility when he reports v ′ instead of true valuation v is
From the incentive compatibility property of M OPT , we get
for every l. Summing over l proves the lemma. So from here onwards, we can assume that M OPT is symmetric; in the optimal mechanism, let h(j, v) be the probability that the buyer gets an item for payment p j when his valuation is v. Thus the revenue of M OPT can be represented using the sum of identical (and correlated) random variables X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n , where for each i,
.., X ′ n be a set of random variables such that the marginal distribution of X i and X ′ i is same for each i. Let M soft be a soft randomized sequential mechanism whose allocation and payment functions are same as M OPT . Using correlation gap, we get
Let M be the mechanism obtained by applying the inventory constraint on M soft , i.e. it stops when items run out. We note that M is still a BIC mechanism: even though the probability of allocations and payments for a buyer for valuation v is not same in M soft and M, these values remain same conditioned on reaching a buyer without running out of inventory. We now bound the expected utility of M in the following lemma, its proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4.
Thus it suffices to guess the values h(j, v) for each j, v to compute a (1 − 1/e) 2 -approximate mechanism. However such algorithm will require exponential time. We need the following lemma to get a polynomial time algorithm.
Lemma B.3 Consider two randomized and symmetric sequential pricing mechanism M 1 and M 2 with inventory constraint of k, and let h 1 (v, j) and h 2 (v, j) be their payment functions, such that
Its proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4. We note an important step in the proof: if two symmetric mechanisms have the same probability for each payment, then the revenue distribution per buyer remains same, and we do not lose a factor of (1 − 1/e) in the approximation ratio during the split-and-merge operation.
Thus per buyer values of probability for each large payment (q j ), the utility from huge payments (H) and the revenue from the small payments (R); the feasibility of a configuration can be checked using an LP.
C Omitted Details from Section 4
BIC Mechanisms for a Risk Averse Sellers: LP to check the feasibility of a configuration
D Mechanisms for a Risk Neutral Seller and Risk Averse Buyers
In this section, we design mechanisms for a risk neutral seller when buyers are risk averse. The following theorem summarizes our result; it shows that (a) optimal BIC mechanism can be designed for risk averse seller and (b) the gap between an optimal truthful-in-expectation and an optimal BIC mechanisms is bounded by γ(k).
Theorem 4 Given risk averse buyers and a risk neutral seller, let OPT be the expected revenue of the optimal BIC mechanism. Then (a) there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute a truthful-in-expectation mechanism with expected revenue γ(k)OPT, and (b) there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute a BIC mechanism with expected revenue OPT.
Proof:
We begin by proving the first part of the theorem. We note that the objective of the following LP is at least OPT. The first constraint in the LP ensures that the mechanism is truthful, the second constraint ensures that exactly one allocation-payment event realizes in expectation for a buyer's bid, and the third constraint is the inventory constraint.
We construct a mechanism from the LP solution using Algorithm 1. We note that the mechanism is truthful-in-expectation: the position of buyer i in the sequence is independent of his valuation, and conditioned on reaching him without running out of items, he allocation and payment probabilities are equal to the LP solution. We now establish the approximation bound.
For the purpose of analysis, we replace the payment from buyer i with a deterministic quantity
i.e. the probability of allocation to buyer i. Further, let k exp = i,j,v h(i, j, v)f i (v). W.l.o.g., assume that the mechanism processes buyers in order 1, 2, 3, ..., n. Let r i be the probability that k items are allocated before buyer i arrives. We have r 1 ≤ r 2 ≤ .... ≤ r n , and Arrange the buyers in the decreasing order of
. for each buyer i in the sequence do if there is at least one item remaining then Ask buyer i for his valuation. Let v be his reported valuation. Allocated an item to him w.p. j h(i, j, v), and he makes a payment of p j w.p.
l h(i,l,v) in this case. When he is not given an item, he makes a payment of p j w.p.
The revenue of the mechanism is
where the last inequality follows using t 1 ≥ t 2 ≥ ... ≥ t n , and i r i × prob i ≤ (1 − γ(k)) × k. This completes the proof of the first claim. Now we consider the second part of the theorem. Its proof is similar to the first part; we consider an LP as earlier, however we also add a separation oracle for the Border's inequality; [3] show that such separation oracle can be designed in polynomial time. The constructive proof of the Border's inequality also gives a way of allocating items to buyers based on their valuations honouring supply constraints. When an item is allocated to buyer i, then he is charged p j w.p.
. Similarly, when he is not allocated an item, he pays p j w.p.
. Thus the payment functions of a buyer can be implemented exactly.
E DSIC Mechanisms for Risk Averse Sellers: Unit Demand Buyers
In this section, we consider the problem of designing DSIC mechanisms for a risk averse sellers in a multi-parameter settings where buyers are unit-demand. We are able to combine our techniques with a recent approximation result for revenue maximization for the unit-demand problem, when there are multiple distinct items. We note that for such multi-parameter settings, no characterization of an optimal mechanism is known even for the expected revenue objective. This gives our second result.
Theorem 5 For unit-demand setting with multiple distinct items, there is a poly-time computable randomized order-independent sequential posted price mechanism with expected utility at least 1−1/e 6.75 − ǫ OPT, for any ǫ > 0, where OPT is the expected utility of an optimal DSIC mechanism.
Our obtain our result by combining our tools for handling risk aversion with a recent result of Chawla et. al. [6] , who gave a 1 6.75 -approximation to this problem for the expected revenue objective. The approximation factor has since been improved to 1 4 for expected revenue, by Alaei [2] . To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm gives the first non-trivial approximation guarantee for maximizing expected (concave) utility in any multi-parameter setting.
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 5. We will reduce the problem of designing a mechanism for any instance I of a unit-demand setting with n buyers and m items to finding a special type of mechanism for an instance I ′ of a single parameter setting with matrix feasibility constraint. Matrix feasibility constraint is defined as follows: there are mn buyers arranged in an n × m matrix, and the seller can serve at most one buyer from each row and at most one buyer from each column. There is a natural mapping between the two instances: split buyer i ∈ I into m independent buyers i1, i2, ..., im and the distribution on the valuation of buyer ij is same as the distribution of buyer i's valuation for item j. Clearly any feasible assignment of items in I corresponds to a feasible assignment of items in I ′ and vice versa.
We define a class of pricing mechanisms, called partially order-oblivious posted pricing (partial-OPM), for the single parameter setting with matrix constraint: the mechanism specifies an ordering σ on the rows on the matrix, along with independent price distributions for all buyers. All buyers in row σ(i) (i th row in the sequence) of the matrix arrive before any buyer in row σ(i+1); however, the order of buyers in each row σ(i) is chosen adversarially, where the adversary knows the valuation of buyers and the mechanism's prices and wishes to minimize the utility obtained. Partial-OPM in I ′ can be mapped naturally to an SPM for I: buyers arrive in the order specified by σ, and if buyer ij was offered a price of x in I ′ , then buyer i is offered item j at a price x (if item j is available when buyer i arrives). The following lemma describes the relation between these two types of problems.
Lemma E.1 Given a unit-demand instance I and its corresponding single-parameter instance I ′ as defined above, if OPT and OPT ′ are the optimal expected utilities for I and I ′ respectively, then OPT ′ ≥ OPT. Furthermore, given any partial-OPM for I ′ , there is a poly-time computable SPM for I with expected utility at least as much as the expected utility of the partial-OPM for I ′ .
Proof: The scheme for designing an approximate utility-optimal mechanism mirrors the scheme for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanism in [6] , as follows. Fix any utility optimal deterministic mechanism M OPT for I. Note that, any deterministic truthful multi-parameter mechanism for unit demand buyers can be interpreted as offering a price menu with one price for each item/service to each buyer as a function of other buyers' bids [15] . We construct a corresponding mechanism M ′ on I ′ that has the same allocation function as in [6] . In every realization of the bid vector, the revenue in M ′ is at least as large as the revenue in M OPT . Thus the utility of the former is at least the utility of the latter. So the optimal expected utility on I ′ is at least as much as the optimal expected utility on I.
Next, similar to [6] , we show that we can use a partial-OPM M ′ for I ′ to construct an item pricing mechanism M for I. Order the buyers in I as per the order of rows of matrix in M ′ , and fix a realization of buyers' valuations and prices in M ′ . In the corresponding realization in I, when buyer i ∈ I arrives, he is shown the set of available items and the price asked for item j is the price asked for buyer ij ∈ I ′ . As the buyer i chooses the item that maximizes his utility, the revenue from buyer i is no less than the revenue from buyers in row i in I ′ (since the mechanism in I ′ is order-oblivious within a row). Thus the revenue obtained in M is at least the minimum revenue (among all orderings of buyers within each row) in M ′ , for every realization of prices and valuations. Hence the expected utility of M is at least as much as the expected utility of M ′ .This completes the proof of the lemma.
It is worth noting that Lemma E.1 deviates from the reduction used by Chawla et. al. [6] from unit-demand setting to a single-parameter setting for expected revenue in the following manner: Chawla et. al. [6] computed a completely order-oblivious posted pricing (where even buyers in different rows can be intermingled adversarially) for I ′ , which yields a completely order-oblivious posted pricing for I. This implication remains true for utility as well. However, we are not able to analyze the performance of a complete OPM in the case of expected utility; instead, we are able to compute a partial-OPM with a good approximation guarantee on expected utility in I ′ . As will be clear below, the only part where we need to restrict ourselves to partial-OPMs is Lemma E.3. Its analogue for revenue holds even for complete OPMs by a simple application of Markov's inequality [6] , but the proof is more complicated for utility maximization.
In the rest of the section, we prove the following theorem, which combined with Lemma E.1 implies Theorem 5.
Theorem 6
For the single parameter setting with matrix feasibility constraint, there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute a partial-OPM with a given ordering among the rows and expected utility 1−1/e 6.75 − ǫ OPT. Furthermore, the price distributions computed by the algorithm yields this guarantee for any ordering σ among the rows.
Let M OPT be an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism for a single-parameter instance with matrix constraint, so by incentive compatibility, every buyer is offered a price as a function of other buyers' bids. Let P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} be the set of distinct prices offered in any mechanism. Let π ijk be the probability that buyer ij is offered price p k in M OP T s . We note the important properties of prices in M OPT : (a) j,k π ijk (1 − F ij (p k )) ≤ 1 ∀i (at most one buyer is served from the i th row), (b) i,k π ijk (1 − F ij (p k )) ≤ 1 ∀j (at most one buyer is served from the j th column), and (c) k π ijk ≤ 1 ∀i, j (buyer ij is offered only one price in every realization). We define soft-OPM as a type of posted pricing mechanism, where (a) the prices for buyers are drawn independently, (b) it allocates items to all buyers who have valuations above their respective offered prices, and (c) satisfies feasibility constraints in expectation but not in every realization. In other words, a soft-OPM sets prices so that it sells to at most one buyer in expectation in each column and in each row. It is obvious that the utility obtained by a soft-OPM is independent of the arrival order of buyers, and the revenue from a buyer is independent of past or future events in a realization of the mechanism.
We note an important property of soft-OPMs in the following lemma. It enables the redistribution of probability mass for any given price across buyers, and makes it sufficient to guess the total sale probability at each price. It is the analogue of Lemma 3.7 for multi-unit auctions. Its proof is practically identical to that of Lemma 3.7 -it applies a series of split operations followed by a series of merge operations to transform an optimal mechanism to a given soft-OPM. The only difference is that the submodular function in this case is U ∞ instead of U k , that is, there is no explicit bound on the inventory. So we skip the proof of this lemma.
Lemma E.2 Consider any soft-OPM M 1 , that offers price p k ∈ P with probability π ′ ijk , and satisfies the following condition:
i,j π ′ ijk (1 − F (p k )) = i,j π ijk (1 − F (p k )) = q k , ∀p k ∈ P (for every price, the total sale probability, i.e. the sale probabilities summed over all buyers, at a given price in M 1 is the same as that in M OPT ). Then U(M 1 ) ≥ (1 − i.e. the threshold where the total sale probability of all large prices add up to at least 1/ǫ 4 . If such a threshold does not exist, then let p * = 0. Let P sm be all prices less than p * , so that P lg = {p k | U −1 (OPT/ǫ) > p k ≥ p * }. Now, using Lemma 3.8 in the proof of Lemma E.2 allows us to prove the following variant of Lemma E.2. The proof of Lemma E.4 is practically identical to that of Lemma 3.4, so we omit it.
Lemma E.4 Consider any soft-OPM M 1 , that offers price p k to buyer ij w.p. π ′ ijk , such that (a) i,j,p k ∈Psm p k π ′ ijk (1 − F ij (p k )) = p k ∈Psm p k q k , (b) for each p k ∈ P lg , i,j π ′ ijk (1 − F ij (p k )) = q k , and (c) i,j,p k ∈P hg U(p k )π ′ ijk (1 − F ij (p k )) = p k ∈P hg U(p k )q k . Then we have U(M 1 ) ≥ (1 − 1 e − O(ǫ))OPT.
Thus it suffices to guess (a) the threshold p * separating large and small prices, (b) the total probability of sale q k for each large price p k , (c) the expected revenue from small prices R, and (d) the expected contribution to utility, say h, from huge prices. Just as in the case of multi-unit auctions, the large prices (and hence the threshold p * as well) can be discretized so that they come only from the set U −1 (ǫ 5 tOPT) for any integer 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 ǫ 6 . Similarly, h and U(R) can be guessed up to a multiple of ǫOPT, and the total sale probability for each large price to the nearest multiple of ǫ 8 . All these guesses define a configuration. The number of configurations is bounded by 2 poly(1/ǫ) .
In the above LP, the variable x ijk denotes the probability that buyer ij is shown price p k . Each feasible configuration gives us a soft-OPM and we select the one with maximum utility.
